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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal
pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(i) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the trial court properly impute income to Mr. Colburn
of $40,000 per year for purposes of computing alimony when there
were no jobs available in the aviation insurance business, the
highest job offer received outside his field of expertise was
$23,000 per year and working as a certified financial planner
represented the most lucrative long-term employment reasonably
available?

Reviewed to determine if abuse of discretion in

applying appropriate legal standards. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018,
1021 (Utah App. 1993).
2. Did the trial court properly award alimony to Mrs. Colburn
of $1,000 per month for five years and $500 per month thereafter
where Mrs. Colburn1s monthly income is $3,092.00 more than Mr.
Colburn's actual monthly income and only $35.00 less than Mr.
Colburn's monthly income using imputed earnings of $'i,333 per
month? Reviewed to determine if abuse of discretion in applying
appropriate standards.

Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P. 2d 250, 251-52

(Utah App. 1993); Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah App.
1991).
3. Did the trial court properly award Mrs. Colburn 34% of Mr.
Colburn's Navy retirement benefits based on years of marriage
rather than 19.5% based on the point system utilized by the Navy?
Reviewed for correctness without any special deference. Bingham v.
1

Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1994); Smith v. Smith, 793
P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
None.
STATUTES
Section 30-3-5(7)(a)(b)(c) U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
(a)
The court shall consider at least the following
factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient
spouse;
(ii)
the recipients' earning capacity or ability to
produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in
determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the
standard of living, existing at the time of separation,
in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (a) .
However the court shall consider all relevant facts and
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base
alimony on the standard of living that existed at the
time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no
children have been conceived or born during the marriage,
the court may consider the standard of living that
existed at the time of the marriage.
Section 78-45-7.5(7) U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the
parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing is
held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall
be based upon employment potential and probable earnings
as derived from work history, occupation qualifications,
and
prevailing
earnings
for persons
of
similar
backgrounds in the community.
RULES
None.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 12, 1994, Mary Elizabeth Colburn

(hereinafter "Mrs.

Colburn") filed an action in the District Court of Summit County,
Utah, seeking a divorce from James Robert Colburn (hereinafter "Mr.
Colburn").
On September 14, 1994, the case was tried without a jury
before the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki.
On March 3, 1995, the court executed the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce after having resolved
post-trial issues primarily relating to the language to be included
in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

The parties were married on September 1, 1973, in San

Francisco, California. (R. 212, f 2 FOF) .
2.

The parties have two children born as

issue

of the

marriage, Michelle Renee Colburn who was born March 19, 1977 and
James Andrew Colburn who was born on April 12, 1983. (R. 212, 5 4
FOF) .
3. Mr. Colburn is a former aviation underwriter having worked
for National Aviation Underwriters from 1971 through February, 1988
and Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters from May, 1988 until
July 1, 1992. (Tr. 77,83,85,90).
4.

Mr. Colburn lost his employment at both National Aviation

Underwriters and Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters when
both companies downsized as a result of the contracting aviation
3

underwriting business. (Tr. 83-84, 88; R. 212, 5 6 FOF)•
5.

Mr. Colburn's earned income for the six years prior to

trial was as follows:
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

$117,980
$129,802
$140,585
$126,286
$
0
$
0

(Defendant's Exhibit 27; R. 212, f 7 FOF).
6. Mr. Colburn attempted to locate employment as an executive
in the aviation insurance industry for approximately six months
after losing his job at Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters
in July, 1992. In this regard, he contacted headhunters but nobody
wanted

to pick up aviation executives because

industry;

he

contacted

all

of his previous

it was a dying

contacts; and

he

contacted six or seven companies in the aviation industry and there
was

no

employment

underwriters.

options

for

senior

aviation

insurance

(Tr. 93,96,97; R. 212, f 8 FOF).

7. Mr. Colburn considered going into other areas of insurance
other than aviation.

However, there were no jobs available in the

Marine Division of Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters and
New York Life started agents at $13,000 per year.

The best offer

Mr. Colburn received was selling financial products/insurance for
IDS at $23,000 per year. (Tr. 90,98; R. 212, f 8 FOF).
8.

In 1986, Mr. Colburn started working toward obtaining a

certified financial planner (CFP) designation as his second career
because he foresaw huge cutbacks in the aviation insurance business
4

as

a

result

of

product

liability

suits,

low

premiums

and

substantial decreases in the production of new aircraft. (Tr. 7982; R. 213, J 9 FOF).
9.

In June f 1993, the parties moved to Park City, Utah to

pursue Mr. Colburn f s financial planning business. (Tr. 102).
10.

In August, 1993, Mr. Colburn started Summit Financial

Advisors Group, Inc.. (Tr. 102).
11.

Mr. Colburn had no earnings in 1993 and the parties lived

off their substantial savings. (Tr. 104; Defendant's Exhibit 27).
12.

At the time of trial, Mr. Colburn was earning $2 64.00 per

month as a certified financial planner. (R. 211, f 5 FOF).
13.

At the time Mr. Colburn chose to become a certified

financial planner the parties realized it would take four to five
years to establish a secure and profitable business. (Tr. 105; R.
213, 5 11 FOF).
14.
age.

At the time of trial Mr. Colburn was fifty-one years of

He is in good health, has a college education and job skills

from employment in the insurance industry that can be transferred
to different or other fields of employment. (Tr. 75; R. 213, f 10
FOF) .
15.

The Court determined that Mr. Colburn was voluntarily

underemployed as a certified financial planner and determined that
he could earn a minimum salary of $40,000 per year should he choose
to remedy his voluntary underemployment based on his work history,
historical income, occupational gualif ications, prevailing earnings
of

people

with

similar

backgrounds
5

in the

community

and

the

testimony of experts. (R. 213, f 12 FOF).
16.
age.

At the time of trial, Mrs. Colburn was forty-two years of

She is in good health, has a college education and secure

employment as a registered nurse at a salary of $2,900.00 per
month. (Tr. 35; R. 213, f 13 FOF).
17.
totaling

During the marriage the parties acquired Non-IRA assets
approximately

approximately

$450,000

and

IRA

assets

totalling

$608,000 which by stipulation of the parties was

divided equally between them. (R. 214,219, J 15,35 FOF).
18.

The Court determined that a reasonble expected rate of

return on the above referenced non-IRA funds is six percent per
annum.

Accordingly,

each

party

was

attributed

$1,125.00

in

interest on their non-IRA funds to be added to their incomes in
calculating child support. (R. 214, I 16 FOF).
19.

Mr.

Colburn

is

the

owner

of

an

additional

ULTRA

investment account which he acquired via an inheritance from his
father.

At

$61,220.67.

the

time

of

trial,

the

account

was

valued

at

The imputed rate of return on that account at six

percent per annum is $306.10 which amount is added to Mr. Colburn's
income for purposes of calculating child support. (R. 214, f 17
FOF) .
20.

Exclusive

of

alimony,

Mrs.

Colburn

has

income

of

$4,729.00 per month ($2,900 employment; $1,125 non-IRA earnings;
$704 child support). (R. 213,214,215, f 13,16,18 FOF).
21.

Mrs. Colburn's monthly expenses total $3,906.30 which

include $600 for entertainment, $350 for schooling, $1,500 rent and
6

$2 00

auto

expense

associated

with

the

1993

Subaru

vehicle.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 ) .
22.

Mr. Colburn has actual income of $1,695.00 per month

($264 employment; $1,125 non-IRA earnings and $306 ULTRA earnings).
(R. 211,214, f 5,16,17 FOF).
23.

Mr. Colburn's monthly expenses total $2,179.00 which

include $400 for rent, $200 for entertainment and $150.00 for auto
expenses associated with a 1982 Volvo. (Defendant's Exhibit 28 with
adjustments set forth in Point II).
24.

Mrs. Colburn has a positive cash flow of $823.00 each

month without receiving the $1,000.00 per month alimony awarded by
the Court.

(R. 213,214,215, J 13,16,18 FOF; Plaintiff's Exhibit

7).
25.

Mr. Colburn has a negative cash flow of $484.00 each

month without paying the $1,000 per month alimony award ordered by
the Court. (R. 211,214, f 5,16,17 FOF; Defendant's Exhibit 28).
26.

When alimony is factored into the calculations, Mrs.

Colburn's positive cash flow for the first five years after divorce
increases to $1,823.00 each month and Mr. Colburn's negative cash
flow will increase to $1,484.00 per month. (R. 211,213,214,215,216,
f 5,13,16,17,18,22 FOF).
27.

Mr. Colburn was on active duty with the United States

Navy during the years 1965 through
thereafter until March 31, 1987.
28.

1969 and on inactive duty

(Defendant's Exhibit 20).

Mr. Colburn has retirement benefits from his service in

the United States Navy which utilizes a point system to determine
7

retirement benefits.

Mr. Colburn earned 1,470.00 of his total

retirement points of 2,409 prior to his marriage to Mrs. Colburn.
(Defendant's Exhibit 2 0).
29.

The Court granted Mrs. Colburn 34% of Mr. Colburn1s Navy

retirement based on the years of marriage rather than 19.49% which
reflects the point system calculated by the Navy for awarding
retirement benefits. (Defendant's Exhibit 20; R. 217, 5 29 FOF).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. The trial court improperly imputed income to Mrs. Colburn.
The statute, 78-45-7.5(7)(a) U.C.A. 1953, as amended, specifically
requires as a threshold matter that there be a determination of
voluntary unemployment or underemployment before the Court can
impute income.

Mr. Colburn's diminished income level did not

result from personal preference or voluntary decision, but rather
from events beyond his control
industry.

in the aviation underwriting

Despite his diligent efforts, the highest job offer Mr.

Colburn was able to secure was $23,000 per year selling financial
products/insurance for IDS. Accordingly, the decision to start a
financial planning business in Park City, Utah using Mr. Colburn's
CFP training and contacts was a prudent business decision and does
not constitute voluntary underemployment.
II. The trial court abused its discretion in awarding alimony
to Mrs. Colburn where her monthly income is $3,092.00 more than Mr.
Colburn's actual monthly income and only $35.00 less than Mr.
Colburn's monthly income using imputed earnings for Mr. Colburn of
$3,333 per month. This abuse of discretion is further evidenced by
8

the fact Mrs. Colburn has a positive monthly cash flow of $823.00
and Mr. Colburn has a negative monthly cash flow of $484.00 without
an alimony award.

When alimony is factored into the calculations,

Mrs. Colburn's positive monthly cash flow increases to $1,823.00
each month

and Mr. Colburn's negative

cash

flow

increases

to

$1,484.00 per month.
III.

The trial court improperly awarded Mrs. Colburn 34% of

Mr. Colburn's Navy retirement benefits based on years of marriage
rather than the point system utilized by the United States Navy.
Mr. Colburn accrued approximately 62% of his retirement benefits
prior to marriage and Mrs. Colburn is only entitled to 50% of the
retirement benefits actually earned during the marriage.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY IMPUTED INCOME TO MR. COLBURN
OF $40,000.00 PER YEAR FOR THE PURPOSES OF COMPUTING
ALIMONY INASMUCH AS THERE WERE NO JOBS AVAILABLE IN THE
AVIATION INSURANCE BUSINESS, THE HIGHEST JOB OFFER RECEIVED
OUTSIDE OF THE AVIATION INSURANCE INDUSTRY WAS $23,000 PER
YEAR AND WORKING AS A CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER
REPRESENTED THE MOST LUCRATIVE EMPLOYMENT REASONABLY AVAILABLE.
Utah law requires that before a court may impute income there
must be a finding of voluntary unemployment or underemployment.
Section 78-45-7.5(7)(a) provides:
Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent
stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and
a finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed
or underemployed.
While the foregoing statute refers to a "parent", the above
statute

has

been

used

in

numerous

cases

as

it

pertains

to

imputation of income for the purposes of both child support and
9

; <"«=> Hall v.. Hall, supra, Bell v. Bell, supra,

- • '^"
Willev

and

•« Willev

The issue c: voluntary underemployment has been addressed by
the appellate courts
•I I''

Hail

V,

Hdll,

* ne State

f

t r;ta.i

-umerous occasions.

-iUjJia ,

consultant and software developer and i:aa

itniiiq.-

$100,000 rnr "o^>- * -.*•- ^ P y p ^ c •-^ft '98l- <ui3 ;i9i .

excess .1
Approximately

ten days
salary of $40, y'

,ei 'edi\

*v- husband ^ 4 ,ufu --nat

diminished income levo ! - ^ i i ! - ^ *irr ? r ?r.; ::- is personal oreference
or voluntary decision,
lucrative consulting contracts and the $40,.
the : i : .] jr amp] oyment availab * ^

. ^ per _^d:

The trial

JOJJ

^irt based

Wdb

its chi Id

support and alimony m "
rather than his income .-it : no t ;me i-i *: ; •
^ voluntas '
k.

y

Liio

trial

dLuve

qUOtec*

T

The husband appealed

irn--a»-omployed as required

^latiitfc

l

- -

courl'•. decision that the husband was underemployed
u une

underemploymen t

ISLL.

court.

Ii i addressing the

, . _e nonr* i i ^ .

finding that appellarr , i. roluntarily underemployed
cannot properly be implied in this case. Although the
trial court found that appellant is currently earning
less than he was previously, that isolated findings does
not answer the critical question of whether the drop in
earnings was voluntary.
Rather, appellant's current
1

Mr. Colburn is not appealing the trial court's child support
award even though it is based on imputed income.
This appeal
relates solely to imputing income for purposes of calculating t ho
alimony award
10

earnings, as compared to his historical income, is merely
one element in the matrix of factual issues affecting the
ultimate finding of whether appellant is underemployed.
Many critical questions are left unanswered: What are
appellant's abilities? Is appellant's current salary
below the prevailing market for a person with his
abilities? Are there any job openings for a person with
appellant's abilities? At a minimum, the trial court must
determine appellant's employment capacity and earnings
potential - which it failed to do even in its
determination of the amount to impute under section
(7)(b)- before it could logically conclude that he is, in
fact, underemployed. Inasmuch as there are no subsidiary
findings showing that the trial court actually found that
a person with appellant's abilities could be earning more
in the relevant market, we cannot imply a finding that
appellant is underemployed. We accordingly reverse the
trial
court's
determination
that
appellant
is
underemployed and remand for evaluation of that issue and
the entry of appropriate findings. 858 P.2d at 102 6
In Bell v. Bell, supra, the trial court imputed a $1,500
income to Mrs. Bell despite undisputed testimony that she earned
$863 per month as a part-time teaching assistant at Utah State
University.

The imputed income was based on the level she had

previously earned as a full-time school teacher in another state
approximately two years before she filed for divorce.

The court

noted that no explanation was offered for this unusual income
adjustment and remanded the case back to the trial court for
additional findings on the alimony issue.
Similarly, in Willey v. Willey, supra, the trial court first
imputed income to the wife based on full-time employment at her
current wage of $860.00 per month and then, without any factual
basis, speculated that she could raise her income to $1,500 to
$2,000 per month. In holding the imputation of income was an abuse
of discretion, the court stated:
We do not question the trial court's authority to impute
11

i i icome to Mrs. Willey. Imputing income to an unemployed
or underemployed spouse when setting an alimony award is
conceptually appropriate as part of the determination of
that spouse's ability to produce a sufficient income.
However, i t cannot be premised upon mere conjecture;
instead, it demands a careful -^* "^ecise assessment
requiring detailed findings..
lit 1 the case a t I : a:i : , I::l 1 = 3 : = :! s c J: i :i i i si iff j : i ei it II :)as:i = , f ::: :II : I::l: I
court to determine that Mr. Coiburn is voluntarily underemployed.
"The

rvi 'iri4-^ ^

years.

i n s u r a n c e b u s i n e s s h a s ^r-^ n . ^ r n t r a c t : nq industry

Debbie

ror

:<_ ,

exclusive aviation .rsurance underwriting business :n tne State oi
i -ne
Lire <iil u u
(Tr. 66,67)

was

f o r c e d due "^ -u.c- nature ^r ^~KP business r o

employees and opt

.L*^

With regard to the .:tate . t * 'i^ aviation

insurance

"i 7a 1 :i ne testified:
:

Since 1971 when you first started, have you 3e< = mi: I i J: : .}
changes in the aviation underwriting business?

hat are the major changes that you have seen?

iecreased

respect?

Premiums have dropped, and there isr 4 as much aviation
business ~"*- there.
?A really a depressed market.
10
^
ne vrear

.*» premiums stare *, drop?
io uiey took a 60 percent drop in

going down steady_v uvei

a^ce.

about the number of companies? wh«:>: is your awareness of
the number of companies involve -i \r aviation underwriting?
MUUU

A:

The companies have decreased also.

Q:

And do you have an opinion as to what has caused that?

A:

A lot of it is they haven't made any airplanes for about 15 to
18 years now, and so there isn't any new business coming into
the market when all we are doing is taking business away from
each other. (Tr. 64,65)
Mrs. Valline further testified that she could not hire Mr.

Colburn even with his experience.

Further, if she was able to hire

Mr. Colburn it would be based primarily on a commission inadequate
for Mr. Colburn to support his family.

(Tr. 67,68)

Mr. Colburn also testified to the depressed
aviation insurance industry.

state of the

Using the records put out by the

General Aviation Manufacturers Association, Mr. Colburn testified
that the production of planes have dropped from a high of 17,811
new aircraft in 1978 to a low of 941 in 1992. (Defendant's Exhibit
9)

He also testified when he started in the aviation insurance

business in 1971 there were 42 or 43 companies.
of

companies

had

been reduced

to

15.

In 1986 the number

(Tr. 79)

The

reason

attributed by Mr. Colburn for this dramatic decrease was products
insurance unlimited liability by the manufacturers resulving in no
new aircraft being produced thereby causing reduction of insurance
premiums.

(Tr. 81)

When Mr. Colburn was asked to resign from Southern Marine and
Aviation there were simply no other jobs available anywhere in the
aviation insurance business.
was

forced

upon

recommendation

him

in

Mr. Colburn's letter of resignation

order

for

him

to

get

a

positive

for future employment and receive insurance and

severance pay for four months.
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Mr. Colburn testified that he

attempted to secure work, ^or
the

c:

i v months
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.side and outside of

JviaL.if'11

available, M r . Colburn moved
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experience with executives
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• •
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represented .\
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1
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adir«j,u.. tn^t ^ne naa never

ertified financial planner.
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'!

ifications of M s .

Romboy as evidenced by the following statement:
• T H E COURT:
Okay.
Let me stop \ o , ? >>e, M
Objection is sustained as to her opinion
basis of his employment that being as a-.
both specifically as National Aviation Underwriter and
Southern Maine Underwriters. Voir dire indicates that
she does not have the — i n my opinion the necessary

contact and/or experience as to those particular areas in
which to opine what available employment would be —
alternative available would be for the defendant in this
matter.
However, I will let you pursue the aspect of a CFP. I
believe that foundation has been established for her to
opine as to her, number one, alternative employment
opportunities and she has indicated a familiarity and
studies in the area of CFPs and stocks. I will allow you
to pursue that. (Tr. 126, 127)
After objection by Mr. Colburn's attorney regarding the issue
of the transferability of skills, the court further stated:
THE COURT: Well, she cannot testify as to any insurance
because she has no background there as to general
aviation.
I have allowed her to talk in terms of
transferability as to — and the relationship as to
certified financial planners.
Let me ask Ms. Romboy, how many different categories did
you examine for specific transferability?
THE WITNESS: Excuse me for that pause there. Basically
I took a look at two of them.
THE COURT:

Two of them? Which two were they?

THE WITNESS: They are a marketing and public relations
manager and also management consultant.
THE COURT: And as to those areas I will allow her to give the
low and high range. (Tr. 142)
Connie Romboy then testified that the public relations manager
should earn between $36,000 and $52,000 per year and that while
there is no high range for management consultants fifty percent of
management consultants earn from $24,900 to $51,000 per year. (Tr.
142,143)
It is difficult to imagine that Mr. Colburn who spent twenty
years in the aviation underwriting business could qualify for a job
as a public relations manager or management consultant.
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Che statute re > it nq *

the amount of

imp i.
If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be
based upon employment potential and probable earnings as
derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and
prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in
the community.
As set forth in the testimony of Debbie Valline, Connie Romboy
and

James

national

Colburn,

there

irht

either

locally or
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I t ::: ill > :>y

testified that Mr. Colburn has job SKI 1 tb diM education which could

be transferred to other employment such as a co-pilot

(average

salary $28,000-30,000) marketing public relations (average salary
$36,000-$52,000), or management consultant (average salary $24,900$51,000)•

However, there was no evidence that jobs were available

in these areas especially for Mr. Colburn who is fifty-one years of
age and without experience in these fields.

In fact, Mr. Colburn

specifically testified that he sought employment in non-aviation
insurance fields and received only two job offers at $13,000 and
$23,000 per year.

Mr. Colburn testified he could earn $10.00 per

hour

another

working

for

financial

planner

and

Connie

Romboy

testified that a beginning financial planning consultant would earn
$28,000 per year nationally or $26,600 in the State of Utah. (Tr.
128, 156)

Accordingly, if there is a basis to impute income in

this case it should only be at a maximum of $26,600 per year.
However, there is no evidence that such jobs are available and Mr.
Colburn has a better future owning and operating his own financial
planning business.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED
ALIMONY TO MRS. COLBURN WHETHER OR
NOT INCOME IS IMPUTED TO MR. COLBURN.
In Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court set forth the well-settled standard for alimony in
Utah.

The Court stated:
The most important function of alimony is to provide
support for the [spouse] as nearly as possible at the
standard of living she [or he] enjoyed during the
marriage, and to prevent the [spouse] from becoming a
public charge. English
v. English,
565 P.2d [409] at 411
(Utah 1977)... Three factors... must be considered in
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fixing a reasonable ali mony award:
[1] the financial condit.
[spouse seeking support];

-

* the

[2]
the ability of the L~pc
support] to produce a sufficient
[himself or] herself; and

^ -ec-^ng
income for

£ 3J
the ability
provide support.

spouse]

of

the
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Trie ourt shall consider at least the following
factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient
spouse;
(ii)
the recipients
„ i __
produce income;
(iii) the ability n the payor ;. ouse r. ; roviae support; m d
(iv) the 1 ength o t * : i o rri 1 r r :
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considering
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above,
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monthly

.-

e x p e n s e s «L.

$3f906.30.
In contrast, Mr. Colburn has actual earnings of $1,695.00 per
month ($264 employment; $1,125 non-IRA earnings and $306 ULTRA
earnings).

Mr. Colburn's monthly expenses as set forth in his

Financial Declaration dated August 19, 1994 which was introduced as
Defendant's Exhibit 28 at trial total $2,802.00.

However, by

adding an additional $177.00 per month in child support to arrive
at the court ordered total of $704.00 and reducing expenses by $800
for costs associated with Summit Financial Advisors Group, Mr.
Colburn's total monthly expenses total $2,179 without an alimony
payment.

These monthly expenses include:

$400 for rent, as

opposed to Mrs. Colburn's $1,500 rental obligation; $2 00 for
entertainment

compared

to

Mrs.

Colburn's

$600

per

month

entertainment allowance; and $150.00 for auto expenses associated
with a 1982 Volvo which is $50 less than Mrs. Colburn's auto
expense for her 1993 Subaru.
Based on the foregoing income and expense calculations, Mrs.
Colburn has a positive cash flow of $823.00 and Mr. Colburn has a
negative cash flow of $484.00 without taking into consideration the
alimony ordered by the court.

When alimony is factored into the

calculations, Mrs. Colburn's positive monthly cash flow increases
to $1,823.00 each month and Mr. Colburn's negative cash flow
increases to $1,484.00 per month.

Even with the court imputed

income to Mr. Colburn of $40,000 per year or $3,333 per month, Mrs.
Colburn's actual monthly income is only $35 less than Mr. Colburn's
monthly income.
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t h e marri"*" 0

as possible to U M I
'el J v . H o w e l l ,

1081 (Utah 1988); Jones v. Jones, supra; Hialev v. Hialev. 676 P.2d
379, 381 (Utah 1983).
In Howell, supra, the husband was a pilot for Delta Airlines.
At the time of divorce he had a gross monthly income of $10,120 and
monthly expenses of $7,960.

The wife was a homemaker who had

worked only part time at unskilled labor jobs.

At the time of

trial, the wife had a temporary job where she earned $649.80 per
month and her expenses totaled $5,021.

The wife appealed the

alimony award on the basis that the court did not properly consider
all relevant factors resulting in an unjustifiable low alimony
award.

After citing the three factors outlined above the court

quoted Gardner v. Gardner, supra, for the proposition that the
alimony award

in a long-term marriage should

"to the extent

possible, equalize the parties' respective standards of living and
maintain them at a level as close as possible to that standard of
living enjoyed during the marriage". 806 P.2d at 1212. The Court
after analyzing the alimony and child support award determined that
when the child support obligation ceases approximately fifteen
months after the divorce decree, the husband will have a gross
monthly income of $8,200 in comparison to defendant's gross monthly
income of $2,445.

The court concluded:

The alimony set by the court does not come close to
equalizing the parties' standard of living as of the time
of the divorce, but allows plaintiff a two to four times
advantage. We, therefore, hold that the alimony amount
set by the court was clearly erroneous. 806 P. 2d at 1213
In a footnote to the above language, the court stated:
Exact mathematical equality of income is not required,
but sufficient parity to allow both parties to be on
21

e q u a l f o o t i n g financial]*/ -±x of t h e t i m e o f t h e d i v o r c e
is r e q u i r e d . 3 o c ?..:d at : 2 I 3 .
Tn J u d g e B e n ^ r '

'oncurr.^na o p i n i o n I n Howell, he amplified

the toi eqbinq ui - - •reduce the standard

:

ivini

he paying spouse below that

I !"in e r e c e i v i n q spou se ;
The alimony award, however, need not be
maintain the receiving spouse at the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage if that amount of alimony
would lower the standard of living of the paying spouse
below that of the receiving spouse. Alimony may only
raise the standard of living of the receiving spouse
until it is roughly equal to that of the paying spouse.
It is in this sense that alimony should seek "to the
extent possible, [to] equalize the parties1 respective
post-divorce living standards." Rasband v. Rasband, 752
P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (Emphasis added) 806
P.2d at 1216.
..
Tl I = : .• ::: • ii: !::: addressed the issue of alimony on paqe 9 and I <i I
its nil ing,

a copy of 'which i s attached hereto as Addendum
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x:eeds

-onstitut-

portion of the proceeds to purchase a marital residence. Further,
pursuant to the Financial Declarations submitted by both parties,
Mrs. Colburn has a $1,500 per month rental expense whereas Mr.
Colburn's rental expense is only $400.

With only a small down

payment and a monthly mortgage payment of $1,500 per month, Mrs.
Colburn

could purchase a comfortable marital residence.

In

contrast, Mr. Colburn would have to increase his housing expense by
$1,100 per month to obtain equivalent housing to that of Mrs.
Colburn.
Mrs. Colburn1 s pursuit of a PHD degree does not justify an
alimony award in this action. Mrs. Colburn has a college education
and is employed in her occupation of choice with a salary of
approximately $35,000 per year.

Assuming Mrs. Colburn pursues a

PHD degree, the evidence presented at court is that it would be
completed on a part-time basis so that her salary would continue.
(Tr. 43)

The court awarded Mrs. Colburn alimony of $1,000 per

month rather than $500 per month for the first five years so that
Plaintiff can obtain her PHD degree.

This results in alimony of

$60,000 over the first five years after the divorce without any
evidence that Plaintiff's income would increase with a PHD degree.
Mrs. Colburn testified that her $350.00 per month expense for
"school, kids and graduate school" is for "her graduate school, the
children's school supplies, books and miscellaneous". (Tr. 42). As
set forth in the income and expense figures set forth above, Mrs.
Colburn is in a position to cover her graduate school expenses
should she desire to pursue the same without alimony payments.
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There is no basis for the court to award an extra $500.00 per month
alimony for schooling where the evidence presented is that $350.00
per month covers not only Mrs. Colburn's graduate school but the
children's school supplies, books, etc..
It is submitted that length of marriage has no bearing on
alimony in this case. While the parties were involved in a twentytwo year marriage, Mr. Colburn had only been employed at his
current occupation for approximately one year as of the date of
trial. Mrs. Colburn is ten years younger than Mr. Colburn and she
should be able to generate earnings for ten years longer than Mr.
Colburn.
paid.

A long term marriage does not mean alimony should be

It only means that if alimony is justified, it should

continue for a longer period.
The alimony award in the case at bar does not equalize the
parties' respective standards of living.

On the contrary, it

increases Mr. Colburn's negative cash flow from $484 to $1,484 per
month and increases Mrs. Colburn's positive cash flow from $823 per
month to $1,823 per month.

A discrepancy of $3,3 07 per month or

$39,684 per year without even taking into consideration the tax
consequence is clearly unwarranted.
POINT III.
THE COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED MRS. COLBURN NAVY
RETIREMENT BENEFITS BASED ON YEARS OF MARRIAGE
RATHER THAN THE POINT SYSTEM UTILIZED BY THE NAVY.
Mr. Colburn served in the United States Navy from December 10,
1965 through March 31, 1987.

He was on active duty during the

first four years and in the Naval reserves thereafter. The United
24

States Navy utilizes the point system to determine the amount of
retirement benefits.

At the time of marriage, Mr. Colburn had

acquired 1,470 or 61% of 2,409 retirement points accumulated at the
time of retirement.

The trial court awarded Mrs. Colburn 3 4% of

Mr. Colburn 1 s navy retirement based on the fact the parties were
married

during

68%

retirement benefits.

of

the

years

Mr.

Colburn

was

acquiring

In so ruling, the court failed to take into

consideration that Mr. Colburn was in active duty with the Navy
prior to the marriage when the majority of the points were acquired
and was on inactive status only during the marriage.
Mr. Colburn is not asserting that his wife is not entitled to
a share in his military retirement.

Utah Courts have clearly

established that retirement benefits are to be divided between the
parties in a divorce action.
App.

Greene v. Greene, 751 P.2d 827 (Utah

1988) Motes v. Motes, 786 P. 2d 232

Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (1990).

(Utah App. 1989) and

Mr. Colburn is appealing

the trial court's decision to allocate the Navy retirement based on
years of marriage rather than the point system utilized by the
United States Navy.
While there are no Utah cases on this issue, In Re Marriage of
Poppe, 97 Cal.App.3d 1, 158 Cal.Rptr. 500 (1979) is directly on
point.

In Poppe, the husband retired from the Navy with a total of

5,002 points of which only 1,632 were earned during the marriage.
The majority of the points were earned while the husband was on
active duty prior to the marriage.

The husband contended that the

trial court should impute the wife's interest in the pension by
25

multiplying one-half times the fraction 1632/5002 times the amount
of the pension to arrive at her retirement benefit.
trial court determined

that the husbandfs

However, the

"qualifying" years

totaled 31.50 and apportioned the pension on the basis of the "time
rule" by dividing the 27.25 years between marriage and separation
by the 31.5 "qualifying" years to arrive at the wife's benefit.
The Court ruled that "apportionment on the basis of the time rule
is appropriate only where the amount of the retirement benefits is
substantially related to the number of years of service".

The

Court

not

then

indicated

that

the

husband's

pension

is

substantially related to the number of years he served in the Naval
Reserve.

The Court stated:

...the amount of the pension is not a function of the
number of years of service; the number of years of
service during the marriage is not a fair gauge of the
community contribution; and the court's apportionment of
the pension on the basis of the number of "qualifying"
years served as compared to the number of years of
service during the marriage must be said to be
unreasonable, arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. 158
Cal.Rptr. at 504.
Although it is fairly obvious that apportionment on the
basis of points as urged by former husband would be
appropriate, we would usurp the function of the trial
court by modifying the judgment to apportion the
retirement benefits on that basis. 158 Cal.Rptr. at 505.
(A copy of In Re Marriage of Poppe, supra, is included as part
of the Appendix herein inasmuch as it is part of the California
Reporter system which may not be readily available to the court.)
Similarly, In re Marriage of Davis, 113 Cal.App.3d 485, 169
Cal.Rptr. 863 (1980), the court scrutinized a military pension and
concluding that the final ten years of the employee-spouse's
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service contributed nothing to the retirement benefits since this
period of service consisted of reserve duty rather than active
duty.

The court found that though the full thirty-year period was

required in order to receive benefits, the final ten years were
"merely a condition precedent .... The right to retired pay is
earned solely by service on active duty."

(Id. at p. 489, 169

Cal.Rptr. 863.)
In the case at bar, the trial court utilized years of marriage
as a basis to divide the Navy retirement relying on Woodward v.
Woodward, 656 P.2d

431

(Utah 1982).

In Woodward. the husband

argued that his wife should not share in his military retirement on
the basis it was not a marital asset inasmuch as he had only worked
fifteen years at Hill Air Force Base and he would need to work
thirty years to receive maximum benefits under the retirement plan.
The court in addressing the vesting issue stated:
....Whether that resource is subject to distribution does
not turn on whether the spouse can presently use or
control it, or on whether the resource can be given a
present dollar value. The essential criterion is whether
a right to the benefit or asset has accrued in whole or
in part during the marriage.
To the extent that the
right has so accrued it is subject to equitable
distribution.
In the instant case, the husband must work for another
.- fifteen years to qualify for the maximum benefits under
the pension plan. He will not qualify in the twentyninth year or in the next to the last month. Because he
must work a total of thirty years, his pension benefits,
including any contribution by the government, are as
dependent on the first fifteen years as the last fifteen.
Thus, the wife is entitled to share in that portion of
the benefits to which the rights accrued during the
marriage. We hold that the trial court did not err in
making equitable distribution of the husband's retirement
benefits. 656 P.2d at 432, 433
27

As set forth above, the non-working spouse is entitled to only
share in "that portion of the benefits to which the rights accrued
during the marriage".

This principle was addressed in Dunn v.

Dunn, 802 P. 2d 1314

(Utah App. 1990) in the context of the

husband's claim for projected earnings of $90,908 on the $43,173
portion of retirement benefits which accumulated prior to marriage.
The Court held that Mr. Dunn should be credited with all premarital
contributions as well as interest thereon. This decision was based
on the "general rule...that equity requires that each party retain
the separate property

he or she brought

into the marriage,

including any appreciation of the separate property."

802 P.2d at

1320
The trial court's decision to award the navy retirement on the
basis of years of marriage did not take into consideration that
over 60% of the retirement benefits accrued prior to marriage when
Mr. Colburn was on active duty.

Accordingly, the decision of the

trial court should be reversed and Mrs. Colburn awarded retirement
benefits computed by multiplying

one-half times the fraction

939/2409 times the amount of the pension or 19.5% of Mr. Colburn's
Navy retirement.
CONCLUSION
This Court should vacate the alimony award on the basis that
it was improper to impute income Mr. Colburn or, alternatively,
that no alimony should be awarded where Mr. Colburn's imputed
monthly income is only $35 more than Mrs. Colburn's actual monthly
income. Further, this court should award Mrs. Colburn 19.5% of Mr.
28

Colburn's United States Navy retirement benefit based on the navy
point system rather than the years of marriage which does not
accurately reflect the retirement rights accrued prior to marriage.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this & tU day of October, 1995.

Christiansen
& CHRISTIANSEN, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant, were mailed, postage prepaid, to John
B. Anderson, Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent, 623 East First
South, P.O. Box 11643, Salt Lake^pity, Utah ^8^147-0643, on this
fopL day of October, 1995,
Terry L). Christiansen
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6

Salt Lake City, UT 84102

7

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

8

TERRY L. CHRISTIANSEN

9

ATKINS & CHRISTIANSEN

10

P. 0. Box 680284

11

Park City, UT

12

COALVILLE, UTAH; SEPTEMBER 13, 1994; A.M. SESSION

13

THE COURT:

14

in session.

15

matter.

16

84068

The record will show that we are back

I'm Ready to render a decision in this

To begin with jurisdiction and grounds have been

17

established in this matter and plaintiff is to receive a

18

decree of divorce in this matter.

19

reasonable visitation to defendant with a minimum of

2.0

statutory schedule.

21

extreme liberal visitation in addition to the statutory.

22

I think the children have benefited from both parents and

23

that will continue to be.

24
25

Custody to plaintiff,

I encourage that there be very

Some observations Ifd like to make at this time.
There is no doubt that Mr. Colburn has been a very good
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1

provider for the children and the family.

2

doubt that he has planned successfully, financially, in

3

this matter.

4

large extent, which will cover most of the college

5

expenses in this matter.

6

because of his past good planning and good deeds that any

7

future award should be mitigated because of the past. I

8

just mention that to recognize that Mr. Colburn has done a

9

very good job in providing.

10
11

There is no

That he has set apart for college, to a

But that still doesn't mean that

I am impressed with the

amount of assets that have been amassed in this matter.
Let's get to the biggest issue, is voluntary

12

unemployment or under employment.

13

unemployed when he is voluntarily under employed.

14

to look at different factors to consider and to render

15

findings pursuant to the Hall decision.

16

the Hall decision stands for, you better make findings or

17

else we are going to reverse it.

18

Obviously he is not
I have

If anything else,

The finding is that I do find that he is

19

voluntarily under employed.

The factors that go to this

20

are as follows:

21

going from a high in 1991 of $140,000 a year, just on

22

salary, to a low of zero in 1993.

23

obviously a substantial change.

24

had anything to do with being released from his latest

25

employment with Southern Aviation and Marina.

The historical perspective of his income

There has been

I'm not saying that he
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3

1

beyond his control.

I do find that he did not voluntarily

2

quit that position.

Even though the letter of resignation

3

says what it says, the parole evidence indicates and

4

explains to the court the reason why, the practicalities

5

are very reasonable and I accept the representations as

6

such.

7

However, I have to consider since his release

8

from employment of a igh of $140,000 a year what the

9

defendant has voluntarily chosen to do in this matter.

10

has chosen to pursue the area of a certified financial

11

planner.

12

termination in 1988 or in 1992 by beginning classes in

13

that extent.

14

asked, upon cross-examination or even direct examination,

15

if he would choose to go in one area or another.

16

were answers to the effect that:

17

certified financial planner.

18

my education in.

19

He was even planning to do that prior to his

There were many times in his testimony when

There

I chose to be a

This is what I had received

This is what I want to develop.

He did that knowing that start-up time at a

20

minimum of four to five years will have to occur before

21

anything of fruition would come of his efforts.

22

understood that in coming to an area such as Park City,

23

Summit County, that he would have to, using his words,

24

network to create a foundation.

25

He

He

He choose not to accept other employment or to
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1

look at other employment.

2

more than $246 a month, in his opinion would not afford

3

him, in the long term, any substantial income. And he

4

indicated that a co-pilot would not have much money,

5

somewhere in the area of 28 to mid-30,000 a year.

6

even in his own estimation as to what he would be making

7

as a certified financial planner five years hence, he

8

opines that's possibly a very good income.

9

pressed further he indicates somewhere in the area of 35

10

to 40,000 a year.

11

start-up time.

12

Thatf while initially, may be

But

Then when

Wherein he understood that there was a

The plaintiff and children should not have to

13

suffer from his development of his business in that regard

14

because they certainly have been part of his life up to

15

that point, and if he chose to take a salaried position,

16

if he chose to take some other position other than

17

something that is paying him $246 a month, he very well

18

could have.

19

I have to also look at his qualifications as

20

exhibited by Exhibit Number 4, his resume.

He is a

21

college graduate.

22

certified financial planner.

23

duty, active duty as an officer.

24

as a pilot but did not complete pilot training but was an

25

active officer for the U.S. Navy and reserve officer

He has had additional education as
He has had armed services
He was trained partially
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1

retiring as commander.

In and of itself, extremely good

2

references and experience.

3

However, you take upon it, his substantial work

4

experience with National Aviation Underwriters, Southern

5

Marina and Aviation Underwriters, and the many years from

6

1970 to 1992, a period of 22 years, of which he has held

7

different positions supervised many people: Was a

8

vice-president, president, COO, other extremely important

9

positions in that area.

It is true that there are no

10

comfortable positions available in that area but I must

11

consider what his assets are as to his work experience,

12

his education and the observations that the court makes of

13

the defendant in this matter.

14

He is 51 years old, appears to be in good health.

15

He is very articulate.

16

would lead one to believe that these skills and assets

17

that he has as has been indicated by Ms. Romboy

18

transferred to different other fields.

19

His experience, as I indicated,

In examining the testimony of Ms. Romboy, she had

20

given a range of anywhere from mid-30,000 to $72,000 a

21

years, she opined, as the national average of available

22

types of employment.

23

there is employment that is available of that nature.

24

Even being conservative in looking at Ms. Romboy's

25

testimony, it appears to the court that if Mr. Colburn,

Now that assumes obviously that
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1

with his vast experience, his education and his practical

2

aspects that I find of him to be attractive in that

3

nature, if he were just to apply himself in any other area

4

instead of persisting in the certified financial planning

5

area —

6

doesn't believe in the product, and that may have some

7

limitations on it; he could be selling —

8

IDS, which was a product sales as well as service; he

9

could be doing stock brokerage, if he completes his

he could be selling insurance, although he says he

working with

10

licensing, from six to eight months he indicated that it

11

would take; there would be no doubt in the court's mind

12

that he would be successful in, number one, completing

13

those classes, and number two, receiving his license, and

14

in the same way that he networks and contacts other

15

people, that those qualities that I find so admirable in

16

Mr. Colburn, could also be applied to that situation as a

17

stock broker, or as a trader or something of that nature.

18

He could, in my estimation, make an income of at least

19

$40,000 a year, and I, therefore, impute an income of

20

$40,000 per year to the defendant for the purposes of

21

determining child support.

22

month or thereabouts.

23

That comes out at $3,333 a

I find that the defendant returns between a six

24

percent computation of return on an IRA versus a five

25

percent, although percentage wise appears to be very small
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1

when we are talking about amounts of money as we do.

2

Practically, it becomes large when you have to consider

3

the expenses of both parties involved here.

4

The six percent the court is adopting as a fair

5

amount.

While Mr. Colburn has demonstrated a very keen

6

ability in the investment field, I think that six percent

7

return on income is something that although an art, he

8

artfully can accomplish, even though with the vagaries and

9

variables of the stock market.

In that regard, he would

10

then have a $1,125 a month non IRS, the Ultra account will

11

be awarded to him as his separate property.

12

Mr. Anderson was very candid in indicating that

13

he did not see any instance, other than the one instance

14

in which expenses, or living expenses were used from

15

Ultra.

16

pressed to say that was a living expense.

17

awarded to defendant as sole property.

18

indicate that $583 per month would be that amount that I

19

would impute, that I would include as to other income from

20

that fund, leaving a total of $5,041 a month for the

21

plaintiff —

22

computing child support.

23

Even then that was a vacation.

We would be hard
The Ultra is

But out of that, I

excuse me, for the defendant for purposes of

The plaintiff, on the other hand, has an income

24

of $2,900 a month.

I add to her income $1,125, that would

25

be her half or her share of the non-IRA funds, giving her
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1

a total of $4,025 a month.

2

on that basis.

3

Child support will be computed

In determining alimony, I do have to look at need

4

and ability to pay.

I have to also look at the principal

5

that the alimony is used for the purpose of not having the

6

spouse and children become charges of the state. Not

7

having the spouse become a charge of the state, there is

8

very little likelihood in this instance that Mrs. Colburn

9

would ever have to ask for state assistance, however,

10

there does appear to be a need, their appears to be a need

11

for following reasons:

12

residence in this matter.

13

sold and, true, the money was invested into non-IRA funds

14

of which she is receiving benefit, but the fact of the

15

matter is she has an 11-year old son, a 17-year old

16

daughter who may soon go off the school —

17

11-year old son which she has to raise for another seven

18

years without any marital residence.

19

this time and it appears that there is a need to assist

20

her in her living arrangements as to having a house or

21

even —

22

She very well may be able to purchase a house with a

23

mortgage payment of $1,500 a month.

24

which, the court finds that there is a need.

25

Number one, there is no marital
The marital residences were

at least an

She is renting at

her rent at the present time is $1,500 a month.

But regardless of

There obviously is an ability to pay on behalf of
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1

the defendant based upon the figures that have been

2

introduced today as to his share of the Ultra, as well as

3

his share of the non-IRA accounts.

4

The $43.70 insurance premium has already been

5

stipulated to.

6

alimony.

That will also be paid as part —

Would that be part of alimony?

7

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

8

MR. ANDERSON:

9

THE COURT:

10

as

Child support.

Child support.

Yes, child support.

Thank you.

Now what's the figure she has indicated —

the

11

plaintiff has indicated that she is pursuing her advance

12

degrees and that is laudable, indicating that a Ph.D would

13

take approximately five years to complete on a part-time

14

basis. Accordingly, I award her a thousand dollars a

15

month alimony for five years.

16

reduced to $500 a month terminated upon any statutory

17

grounds being present.

18

a 22-years marriage.

19

and recently bad times.

20
21

24
25

This is a long term marriage it's

The parties have gone through good
The $500 a month will be ongoing.

The jewelry, the court has determined, are gifts.
There will be no credits as to those gifts.

22
23

Thereafter it will be

The business start-up cost of $11,600 will be
split.

$5,800 will be awarded to the plaintiff.
The automobiles, the court, for convenience will

put the Subaru at $1,500.

The Volvo at three
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1

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

2

THE COURT:

3

balance is $12,000.

4

your creative accounting but I have to agree with

5

Mr. Christiansen, that 12,000 is what I see as the

6

difference, and the defendant will be given credit for

7

that $12,000.

8
9

$15,000.

$15,000.

The Volvo at $3 f 000. the

Mr. Anderson, I applaud you as to

The Navy retirement as —

and I read over that

case and it in the number of cases —

divorce cases and

10

retirements that have come since Woodward.

It amazes me

11

there hasn't been a case directly on point regarding Navy

12

retirement.

13

Woodward or the other courts' interpretation of Woodward

14

may have taken that into account, but I'm going to apply

15

Woodward as it is, which would come out to be, I believe,

16

34 percent.

17

Mr. Anderson, if you want to fight the Navy and get all

18

that done, that's fine.

19

value, get credit, that probably is the best way, allowing

20

the defendant to maintain all of his with some credit as

21

to current value.

Maybe it's because of my interpretation of

And I agree with Mr. Christiansen,

If you can get some sort of cash

That is up to you.

22

MR. ANDERSON:

23

THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

Tax deduction is to be given to the

24

plaintiff, who obviously needs it the most at this time.

25

The taxable income, in the event that there comes a time
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1

when the tax deduction would be more beneficial to the

2

defendant, then that would be subject to court order on

3

that.

4

One question that I had was that there was

5

unresolved issue of whether or not there should be a term

6

life insurance or life insurance naming the children as

7

beneficiaries of that insurance.

8

little bit unusual but I will explain my reasoning.

9

defendant will maintain a $75,000 term life insurance

This is going to be a
The

10

naming the youngest child as beneficiary thereof up until

11

the age of 18.

12

daughter reaches majority and then there will be the

13

75f000 term insurance on the defendant's life naming the

14

beneficiary the youngest child.

15

that in the event something does happen, catastrophically

16

to this whole situation, at least this youngest child will

17

have the college fund as well as additional $75,000 term

18

insurance to be applied to his future needs and college.

19

I take that into consideration in comparing the daughter

20

now has approximately $75,000 for college and that is why

21

I am doing it in that manner.

That will not begin until after the

22

What have I left out?

23

MR. ANDERSON:

24

THE COURT:

25

attorneys fees.

The reason I did that is

Attorneys fees.

Attorneys fees.

Each pay their own

I did have that written down.
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1
2
3

for reminding me.
MR. ANDERSON:

Is there anything else we haven't

agreed to?

4

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

5

THE COURT:

6

Personal property will be divided.

THE COLBURN:

8

THE COURT:

10
11

per statute.

We finished.

Stipulated as to one-half uncovered

Plaintiff will get the return of the $2,000

advance that was part of the agreed upon terms.
MR. ANDERSON:

12

according to —

13

and decree?

14

I think that's everything

did you wish that I prepare the finding

THE COURT:

I think if you want to make a stab at

15

that, Mr. Anderson, submit it to Mr. Christiansen for

16

approval prior to the court's signature.

17

MR. ANDERSON:

18

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

19

MR. ANDERSON:

20

THE COURT: Anything else?

21

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

22

THE COURT:

23

I

think they where in the process of doing that.

7

9

I think that's it.

Will do that.
Did you prepare a work sheet?

Yeah.

That's it.

We are in recess.
(Proceedings concluded.)

24
25
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:
County of Salt Lake )

SS.

I, Nora S. Worthen, do certify that I am a

5

Certified Shorthand Reporter and Official Court Reporter

6

in and for the State of Utah; that as such reporter, I

7

reported the occasion of the proceedings of the

8

above-entitled matter at the aforesaid time and place.

9

That the proceeding was reported by me in stenotype using

10

computer-aided transcription real-time technology

11

consisting of pages 3 through 12 inclusive.

12

constitutes a true and correct transcription of the bench

13

ruling in said proceedings.

14

That the same

That I am not of kin or otherwise associated with

15

any of the parties herein or their counself and that I am

16

not interested in the events thereof.

17
18

WITNESS my hand at Salt Lake City, Utah, this
21st day of September, 1994.

19
20
21
22

23
24
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Nora S. Worthen, RPR
Utah License No. 22-106373-7801
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ADDENDUM 2
JOHN B. ANDERSON, ESQ. #0 91
Attorney for Plaintiff
623 East First South
P.O. Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643
Telephone: (801) 363-9345
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARY ELIZABETH COLBURN,

)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
)
])

JAMES ROBERT COLBURN,
Defendant.

Civil No. 944300069DA
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

]

This case came on for trial in the above Court on September
13, 1994, the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding.

Plaintiff

appeared and was represented by her counsel, John B. Anderson, and
Defendant

appeared

Christiansen.

and

was

represented

by

his

counsel,

Terry

Prior to trial the parties had settled a number of

issues, including, but not limited to, the following:

(1) the

question of child custody; (2) the proper division and distribution
of certain IRA and non-IRA securities and savings accounts, which
had been divided pursuant to a prior court order; (3) the division
and distribution of the cash value of a life insurance policy owned
by Defendant; and the. division and distribution of certain personal
property.

The remaining issues were fully tried by the court,

after presentation of witness testimony and other tangible
1

evidence.

Being fully advised in the premises,

the Court now

enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff

and

Defendants

were

actual

and

bona

fide

residents of Summit County, State of Utah, for more than three
months immediately preceding the commencement of this action.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married on September 1, 1973

in San Francisco, California, and since that time have been and now
are wife and husband.
3.

There are irreconcilable differences of this marriage.

Plaintiff and Defendant have maintained separate residences since
June of 1994, and there is no likelihood of reconciliation.
4.

Plaintiff and Defendant have two children born as issue of

this marriage, namely: MICHELLE RENEE COLBURN, born March 19, 1977,
now age 17; and, JAMES ANDREW COLBURN, born April 12, 1983 now age
11.

Plaintiff

children

since

has

had

sole

the

parties

physical
last

lived

custody

of

the

with

each

parties

other,

and

Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to be awarded sole legal care,
custody and control of the minor children as part of the decree of
divorce in this case.
5.

Defendant

is

self-employed

as

a

certified

financial

planner currently earning approximately $264.00 per month, having
previously

worked

as

a

high

level

insurance industry.

2

executive

in

the

aviation

6.
employ,

In June of 1992, Defendant resigned from his last place of
Southern

Marine

and

Aviation.

This

resignation

was

submitted at the request of his employer, and was prompted by
corporate downsizing.
7.

Defendant's

earned

income

in

the

aviation

insurance

business during his last three years of employment was as follows:

8.

1990
1991

$129,802.00
$140,585.00

1992

$126,286.00

Defendant attempted to locate employment as an executive

in the aviation insurance industry for several months after losing
his -hob at Southern Marine and Aviation Underwriters.
there were

no

jobs

available

aviation underwriting

as

industry.

a

result

of

the

However,

contracting

The only -IJob offers Defendant

received was selling life insurance for New York Life at $13,000.00
per

year

and

selling

$23,000 per year.

financial

products/insurance

for

IDS

at

Defendant voluntarily chose not to accept the

job offers with New York Life of IDS or look for or accept other
salaried employment.
8(a).

The Defendant possesses

job skills which could be

transferred to other employment. However, Defendant voluntarily
chose not to seek or accept employment in other areas.
persists in pursuing a career as a certified

Defendant

financial planner

which he began planning even before he left Southern Marine.

3

9.

Defendant chose instead to relocate to Park City, Utah and

establish a practice as a certified financial planner.

Defendant

had begun his education for a certificate in this field in 1986.
10.

Defendant, who is a well educated college graduate and in

good health, has other qualifications and skills, developed during
his prior employment as a high level executive in the insurance
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transferred to different or other fields of employment.
11.

At the time he relocated to Park City, Utah,

Defendant

knew that he would be unable to generate income comparable to his
historical salary, and that it would take four

(4) to five (5)

years to establish a secure and profitable business.

Based upon

these facts, and the fact that Defendant voluntarily chose not to
pursue or accept other salaried employment, the court specifically
finds that Defendant is voluntarily underemployed.
12.

Based

upon

his

work

history,

historical

income,

occupational qualifications and prevailing earnings of people of
similar backgrounds in this community, and the testimony of experts
the court

finds that Defendant could earn a minimum

salary of

$40,000.00 per year, should he choose to remedy his voluntary
underemployment.
13.

Plaintiff is 42 years of age, in good health, and has a

college education.

Plaintiff is currently employed as a certified

nurse at a salary of $2,900.00 per month.

4

C

Plaintiff, who had been

14.

unemployed for a great part of

the marriage, obtained this employment as a means of support after
Defendant chose to set up a practice as a certified

financial

planner.
15.
order

Pursuant to the mutual agreement of the parties and an

issued

by

the

Honorable

David

Young,

at

a

hearing

to

determine temporary support, the parties divided equally their nonIRA accounts, totaling approximately $450,000.00, acquired during
marriage;

it is just and

equitable

that the court adopt that

division and distribution.
16.

A reasonable and expected rate of return on the above

referenced

non-IRA

funds

is

six

percent

(6%)

per

annum.

Accordingly, each party should earn $1,125.00 per month in interest
on those non-IRA funds, and this amount shall be added to each
parties' income and used in calculating child support.
17.

Defendant is the owner of an additional ULTRA investment

account, which is his sole and separate property, having acquired
the funds to purchase that account via an inheritance from his
father.

The account was worth approximately $61,220.67, as of the

date of trial.

The imputed rate of return on that account, at six

percent (6%) per annum, is $306.10 per month, and that amount shall
also be added onto Defendant's income for purposes of calculating
child support.
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18.

The child support award for the parties 1 two (2) minor

children should be based upon the following income figures: (1)
Defendant's

monthly

income

is

$4,764.43

(imputed

income

of

$3,333.33 due to voluntary underemployment, $1,125.00 in interest
income from non-IRA investment accounts, and $306.10 in interest
income from the ULTRA account) and Plaintiff f s monthly income is
$4,025 ($2,900.00 in salary and $1,125.00 in interest income from
non-IRA investment accounts).
19.

The Defendant should pay $703.57 per month as and for

support of the parties 1 two minor children, or $351.78 per month
per child, until such time as the children reach eighteen

(18)

years of age and graduate from school in their normal and expected
year of graduation, whichever is later.
shall commence

on October

Payment of such support

1, 1994, and be due and payable

to

Plaintiff on the 1st day of each month thereafter.
20.

Plaintiff is currently enrolled at the University of Utah

pursuing an advanced degree. It will take Plaintiff approximately
five (5) years to complete her education.
21.

Without additional education Plaintiff will be unable to

advance in her career or obtain the salary or wages necessary to
support herself in the manner to which she has been accustomed
22.

Plaintiff's expenses currently exceed her monthly income

and Plaintiff has a specific need for alimony to support herself.
The need for support will be greater while she obtains her advanced
degree and it is just and equitable that Defendant pay to Plaintiff
6

the sum of $1,000.00 per month as and for alimony. This obligation
shall commence as of October 1, 1994, and shall be due and payable
on the 1st day of each month thereafter.

Alimony shall terminate

upon Plaintiff's death, re-marriage or co-habitation with a person
of the opposite sex.
23.

At this time the parties have no marital residence, and

the court finds that Plaintiff will need to purchase a home to
replace the one the parties previously sold.

An award of alimony

is necessary to assist her in meeting these costs and in obtaining
suitable living arrangements.
24.

Defendant, who has been awarded property of significant

value, including, but not limited to, non-IRA accounts valued at
the approximate amount of $225,000.00 and the ULTRA account valued
at

the approximately

$63,000.00, has

the

ability

to pay

such

alimony to Plaintiff.
25.

It is contemplated

that Plaintiff will complete her

advanced degree after five (5) years, and that at that time she
will have a greater ability to support herself.

Therefore in

contemplation of the future increase in income and the fact that
this is a long term marriage, after five

(5) years Defendant's

alimony obligation shall be reduced to $500.00 per month, which
amount shall be ongoing, unless terminated on statutory grounds.
26.

The various

items of

jewelry

listed

on

Plaintiff's

financial statements were gifts to her, and are therefore her sole
and separate property, free and clear from any claim by Defendant.
7

27.

The parties recently invested $11,600.00 in Defendant's

business, Summit Financial Advisors Group, Inc., as start up costs.
Defendant should pay over to Plaintiff the sum of $5,800.00 as and
for her share of the those costs.

The Defendant is awarded the

business free and clear from any claim of Plaintiff.
28.

Plaintiff is awarded the 1993 Suburu automobile, which is

valued at $15,000.00, as her sole and separate property.

Defendant

is awarded the 1982 Volvo automobile, which is valued at $3,000.00,
as his sole and separate property.

Defendant should be given a

$12,000.00 credit against sums he may owe to Plaintiff, to equalize
the differences in value.
29.
the Navy.

Defendant has a retirement benefit from his service in
Sixty eight percent

(68%) of this benefit was earned

during the period in which the parties were married.

Applying the

formula set out in Woodward, rather than the naval point system,
Plaintiff should be awarded 34% of Defendant's naval retirement
benefit as her sole and separate property.
30.

Plaintiff, at her sole option, may either seek to obtain

the present cash value of her interest in the naval pension from
the department of the navy, if possible, or may elect to have a
qualified

domestic

relations

order,

or

its

equivalent,

issued

permitting her to collect her share of the pension directly from
the navy at the time Defendant begins drawing payments thereunder.

3

31.

Defendant should cooperate with Plaintiff in obtaining

the qualified domestic relations order if Plaintiff elects that
option, and should also execute all documents necessary to preserve
and protect Plaintiff's interest in the naval pension.

Plaintiff

shall be responsible for the preparation of any Qualified Domestic
Relation Order regarding the Navy retirement and shall bear the
costs associated therewith.
32.
tax

Plaintiff has the greater need for the state and federal

exemptions

provided

for

the

parties1

two

(2)

children.

Plaintiff will also be better able to use the exemptions.

In the

event that there comes a time when the tax deduction would be more
beneficial to the Defendant, then that would be subject to court
order on that.
33.

Defendant is the owner of a USSA life insurance policy,

which policy was acquired during marriage.

This policy should be

sold each party shall receive one-half (1/2) of its present cash
value, provided that no value has been lost or withdrawn since the
date of trial.
34.
regarding

The parties have reached a mutual and amicable agreement
a division

of their personal property

and

household

goods, and it would be just and equitable for the court to adopt
and

sanction

that

division.

The

specific

items

of

personal

property to be awarded to each party are set forth in Exhibit "A"
and Exhibit "B", attached hereto and incorporated by reference.
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35.

During the course of the marriage the parties acquired

IRA plans, which are currently held in Charles Schwab Accounts.
The IRA held in Defendant's name has a current estimated value of
$580,000.00 and the IRA account held in Plaintiff's name has a
current

estimated

value of

$28,000.00.

It would

be just and

equitable that the two (2) accounts be divided equally between the
parties, with each party to have a separate account.
36.

During the course of the marriage, Defendant acquired

interests in three

(3) limited partnerships; identified

in the

pleadings as CalPlans Vinyards, Old Perin Square, and S. Presal
Cottonwood Ltd.

Defendant acquired these interests via inheritance

from his father, and has not commingled

them with any marital

account.
37.

Plaintiff has recently expended $2,000.00 of her personal

funds on educational purposes
oldest child.

for the benefit of the parties•

The parties have established

a uniform gift to

minors account designed to cover such expenses, and it would be
just and equitable for the Plaintiff to be reimbursed from the
account in the amount of $2,000.00.
38.

Plaintiff has available through her place of employment

medical insurance, which she purchases for the parties' two minor
children.

The total cost of the insurance that may be attributed

to the children is $87.40; accordingly Defendant's share of that
cost is $43.70.

This amount should be paid with monthly child

support.
10

39.

It would

be just and proper that the parties

share

equally all other medical, dental and optical costs incurred on
behalfk of the parties 1

children, until such time as the child

reaches eighteen (18) years of age and graduates from high school
in his or her normal year of graduation.
40.
and/or

It would be just and equitable that Defendant purchase
maintain

a

life

insurance

policy

in

the

amount

of

$75,000.00, naming the parties1 youngest child as the sole and
exclusive beneficiary thereon, to provide for that child in the
event that Defendant dies before that child reaches the age of
majority.
41.

The parties have established

uniform gift to minors

accounts on behalf of both of their children, and it would be just
and equitable for Plaintiff to be named as an additional custodian
on the accounts.
42.

The parties each have sufficient resources to pay their

ov/n costs and attorney's fees incurred in this matter, and it would
be just and equitable that each pay their own costs and fees.
43.
solely

The parties have no marital debt, and each should be

responsible

for

any

debt

incurred

after

the

date

of

separation in this matter, and hold each other harmless from any
claims thereon.

It would be just and equitable for Plaintiff to

assume the lease payments on the home in Park City where she is
residing.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The

court

has

subject

matter

jurisdiction

over

the

complaint and personal jurisdiction over the parties hereto,
2.

Plaintiff should be awarded a divorce from Defendant and

Defendant should be awarded a divorce from Plaintiff.
3.

The Decree of Divorce should become final and absolute

immediately upon the Court signing it and the Clerk of the Court
entering it in the Register of Actions.
4.

Plaintiff should be awarded sole care, custody and control

over the parties' two minor children, subject to Defendant's rights
to reasonable visitation. Defendant's rights to visitation shall be
determined by the mutual agreement of the parties; in the event
that the parties are unable to agree, visitation shall be as set
forth in Utah Code Ann., Section 3 0-5-5.
5. Defendant should pay child support to Plaintiff in the
amount of $703.57, commencing

on October

1, 1994, and

thereafter on the first day of each month.

payable

Such child support

shall continue until the parties' minor children reach eighteen
(18) years of age and graduate from school in their normal and
expected year of graduation. This award shall be subject to a
withhold and deliver order, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.. Section
62A-11-501, et.seq.
6.

Defendant should pay over to Plaintiff one half of all

medical insurance costs incurred by Plaintiff on behalf of the
parties 1

minor children.

Currently Defendant's
12

share of these

costs is $43.70 per month, and this amount should be paid on the
1st day of each month, commencing October 1, 1994.
7.

Plaintiff should purchase medical and accident insurance

for and on behalf of the parties minor children, so long as it is
available through her place of employment.
8.

The parties

shall

share

equally

all

other

uncovered

medical, dental, and optical costs incurred on behalf of their
minor

children,

including

deductibles, until

such time as the

children reach eighteen (18) years of age and graduate from high
school in their normal and expected year of graduation.
9.

Defendant should maintain a life insurance policy in the

amount of $75,000.00 naming the parties youngest child as the sole
and exclusive beneficiary thereon, until such time as the parties1
youngest child reaches eighteen years of age and graduates from
high school in his normal and expected year of graduation.
10.

Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $1,000.00 per

month as and for alimony.

This obligation shall commence on

October 1, 1994, and shall be due and payable on the first day of
each month thereafter.

Defendant's alimony obligation shall be

reduced to $500.00 per month after five (5) years, and this amount
shall be ongoing, unless Plaintiff re-marries dies, or cohabits
with a person of the opposite sex.
11.
property,

Plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and separate
free

automobile,

and

from

any

Defendant

claim

by

should
13

Defendant,
be

awarded

the
as

1993
his

Suburu

sole

and

separate property, free from any claim by Plaintiff, the 19 82 Volvo
automobile.

Defendant should be awarded a credit of $12,000.00 to

equalize the differences in value.
12.

Defendant should pay over to Plaintiff $5,800.00 as her

share of the start up costs the parties invested in Defendant's
business venture.

Defendant should be awarded as his sole and

separate property, free from any claim by Plaintiff, all interest
in Summit Financial Advisors Group, Inc.
13.

Defendant should sell the USSA life insurance policy

acquired during marriage, and pay over to Plaintiff one-half (1/2)
of its present cash value, provided that no value has been lost or
withdrawn since the date of trial.

If value has been lost or

withdrawn, then Defendant shall pay over to Plaintiff one-half of
the value of the policy as of the date of the divorce.
14.

Plaintiff

is

entitled

to

34% of

Defendant's

naval

retirement account, and may, at her sole option, either collect a
cash equivalent of the present value of that interest, if permitted
by the Navy, or obtain her interest in monthly increments once
Defendant

begins

to

collect

the

pension.

Plaintiff

should

be

responsible for obtaining a Qualified Domestic Relations Order or
its equivalent from the Navy, at her sole cost and expense, and
Defendant

should

cooperate

in obtaining

such

an

order

and

protecting Plaintiff's interest in that retirement account.
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15.

The parties should immediately divide their IRA

accounts

held with Charles Schwab, with each party having a one-half (1/2)
interest in the IRA account held in the others name,
16.

Plaintiff should be reimbursed in the amount of $2,000.00

for educational expenses she incurred on behalf of the parties
oldest child.

This $2,000.00 should be drawn from the uniform gift

to minors account that the parties have set up in the name of the
parties 1 oldest child.
17.

Plaintiff should be added as an additional custodian on

the children's uniform gifts to minors accounts.
18.

The

court

should

sanction

the division

of

personal

property and household goods mutually agreed to by the parties, and
as set forth in the findings of fact heretofore entered by the
Court.
19.

Each party should pay their own costs and attorney's

fees incurred in prosecuting and defending this matter.
20.

Plaintiff should be awarded the federal and state income

tax exemptions available for the parties 1 minor childr^^1

T

"

the

event that there comes a time when the tax deduction would be more
beneficial to the Defendant, then that would be subject to court
order on that.
21.

Plaintiff

should

be

awarded

all

right, title

and

interest in her jewelry, free and clear from any claim of
Defendant, the same being her separate property having acquired it

by gift.
15

22.

Defendant should be awarded all right, title and interest

in the ULTRA investment account, the CalPlans Vinyards, Old Perin
Square, and S. Presal Cottonwood Ltd., free and clear from any
claim of Defendant, the same being his separate property having
acquired them via inheritance from his father.
23.

The parties, who had no marital debt at the time of

separation, should each assume as their sole and separate debt any
indebtedness incurred by them after the date of separation and hold
each other harmless

from any claim thereon.

Plaintiff

should

assume the lease payments on her residence in Park City, and hold
Defendant harmless from any claims thereon.
24.

The court sanctions the division of the non-IRA accounts

acquired by the parties during the course of the marriage, as
ordered by the Honorable Judge David Young, and as previously
accomplished by the parties.
25.

Each party shall be responsible for any tax consequences

that may arise as a result of the division of the assets and
accounts awarded to them in this action, and should indemnify and
hold the other harmless from any claim thereon.
DATED this

? ^ d a y of Mtf/tje&L

,1995.

HONORABLE GLENN IWASAKI
District Court Judge
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ADDENDUM 3

JOHN B. ANDERSON, ESQ. #091
Attorney for Plaintiff
623 East First South
P.O. Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643
Telephone: (801) 363-9345
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARY ELIZABETH COLBURN,
)

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
vs.

;

JAMES ROBERT COLBURN,

)
;)

Defendant.

Civil No. 944300069DA
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

]

This case came on for trial in the above Court on September
13, 1994, the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding.

Plaintiff

appeared and was represented by her counsel, John B. Anderson, and
Defendant

appeared

Christiansen.

and

was

represented

by

his

counsel,

Terry

Prior to trial the parties had settled a number of

issues, including, but not limited to, the following:

(i) the

question of child custody; (2) the proper division and distribution
of certain IRA and non-IRA securities and savings accounts, which
had been divided pursuant to a prior court order; (3) the division
and distribution of the cash value of a life insurance policy ov/ned
by Defendant; and the division and distribution of certain personal
property-

The remaining issues were fully tried by the court,

after full presentation of the testimony of witnesses and other
1

tangible evidence.

The Court being duly advised in the premises

and having entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1. Plaintiff is awarded a divorce from Defendant and the bonds
of matrimony heretofore existing between Plaintiff and Defendant
are hereby dissolved.
2. This Decree shall become final and absolute immediately
upon the Clerk of the Court entering it in the Register of Actions.
3.

Plaintiff, the mother is hereby awarded the sole legal

care, custody and control of the two

(2) minor children born as

issue of this marriage, namely: MICHELLE RENEE COLBURN, born March
19, 1977, now age 17; and, JAMES ANDREW COLBURN, born April 12,
1983 now age 11,

subject to Defendant's rights to

reasonable

visitation. Defendant's rights to visitation shall be determined by
the mutual agreement of the parties; in the event that the parties
are unable to agree, visitation shall be as set forth in Utah Code
Ann., Section 30-3-35.
4. Defendant

shall pay child

support to Plaintiff

in the

amount of $703.57 per month, commencing on October 1, 1994, and
payable thereafter on the first day of each month.
support shall continue until the parties 1

Such child

minor children reach

eighteen (18) years of age and graduate from school in their normal
and expected year of graduation. This award shall be subject to a
withhold and deliver order, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section
62A-11-501, et.seq.
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5.

Defendant shall pay over to Plaintiff the sum of $43.70 on

the 1st day of each month, commencing October 1, 1994, as and for
his share of the medical insurance costs incurred by Plaintiff on
behalf of the parties 1 minor children.
6.

Plaintiff shall purchase medical and accident insurance

for and on behalf of the parties minor children, so long as it is
available through her place of employment.
7.

The parties

shall

share

equally

all

other

uncovered

medical, dental, and optical costs incurred on behalf of their
minor children,

including

deductibles, until

such time as the

children reach eighteen (18) years of age and graduate from high
school in their normal and expected year of graduation.
8.

Defendant

shall purchase and/or maintain a term

life

insurance policy in the amount of $75,000.00 naming the parties
youngest child as the sole and exclusive beneficiary thereon, and
shall maintain that policy until such time as the parties1 youngest
child reaches eighteen years of age and graduates from high school
in his normal and expected year of graduation.
9.

Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $1,000.00 per

month as and for alimony.

This obligation shall commence on

October 1, 1994, and shall be due and payable on the first day of
each month thereafter.

Defendant's alimony obligation shall be

reduced to $500.00 per month after five (5) years, and this amount
shall be ongoing.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, alimony shall

3

automatically terminate at such time as Plaintiff dies, re-marries
or cohabits with a person of the opposite sex.
10.
property,

Plaintiff shall be awarded
free

automobile,

from

and

any

claim

Defendant

by

should

as her sole and

Defendant,
be

awarded

the
as

separate

199 3
his

Suburu

sole

and

separate property, free from any claim by Plaintiff, the 1982 Volvo
automobile.

Defendant should be awarded a credit of $12,000.00 to

equalize the differences in value.
11.

Defendant shall pay over to Plaintiff $5,800.00 as her

share of the start up costs the parties invested in Defendants
business venture.

Defendant shall be awarded as his sole and

separate property, free from any claim by Plaintiff, all interest
in Summit Financial Advisors Group, Inc., and shall indemnify and
hold Plaintiff harmless from any claims made against that entity.
12.
the

Defendant shall pay over to Plaintiff one-half (1/2) of

present

cash

value

of

in the

USSA

life

insurance

policy

acquired during marriage, provided that value has not been lost or
withdrawn from the policy since the date of the trial in this
matter.

In the event that value has been

lost or withdrawn,

Defendant shall pay over one-half (1/2) of the cash value of the
policy as of the date of trial in this matter.
13.

Plaintiff

is

entitled

to

34% of

Defendant's

naval

retirement account, and may, at her sole option, either collect a
cash equivalent of the present value of that interest, if permitted
by the Navy, or may obtain her interest in monthly increments once
4

Defendant begins to collect the pension.

Defendant and the United

States

documents

Navy

will

execute

any

and

all

necessary

to

protect, preserve and distribute Plaintiff's interest in the naval
retirement account.

Plaintiff's counsel will obtain and prepare

all necessary documents, at Plaintiff's sole cost and expense.
14.

The parties shall immediately divide their IRA accounts

held with Charles Schwab, with each party having a one-half (1/2)
interest in the IRA account held in the others name.
15.

Plaintiff shall be reimbursed in the amount of $2,000.00

for educational expenses she incurred on behalf of the parties
oldest child.

This $2,000.00 shall be drawn from the uniform gift

to minors account that the parties have set up in the name of the
parties' oldest child.

Plaintiff will be responsible for any tax

consequences that may arise from these transactions.
16.

Plaintiff shall be added as an additional custodian on

the children's uniform gifts to minors accounts.
17.

The

court

shall

sanction

the

division

of

personal

property and household goods mutually agreed to by the parties, and
as set forth in the findings of fact heretofore entered by the
Court.
18.

Each party should pay their own costs and attorney's

fees incurred in prosecuting and defending this matter.
19.

Plaintiff should be awarded the federal and state income

tax exemptions available for the parties 1 minor children.

5

In the

event that there comes a time when the tax deduction would be more
beneficial to the Defendant then that shall be subject to court
order on that.
20.

The court sanctions the division of the non-IRA accounts

as ordered by the Honorable Judge David Young, and as previously
accomplished by the parties.
21.

The Plaintiff is awarded all of her jewelry as her sole

and separate property, free of any claim from Defendant, the same
having been acquired by gift.
22.

Defendant is awarded as his sole and separate property,

free from any claim of Plaintiff, the ULTRA investment account, the
interest in CalPlans Vineyards, Old Perin Square, and S. Presal
Cottonwood Ltd., the same having been acquired by inheritance from
his father.
23.

The

parties

had

no

marital

debt

at

the

time

of

separation, and any debt incurred by either party since the date of
separation shall be the sole responsibility of that party, and each
should hold the other harmless from any claim thereon. Plaintiff is
required to assume the lease payments on the Park City home where
she is residing.
24.

Each party shall be responsible for any tax consequences

that may arise as a result of the assets and accounts awarded to
them in this action.

6

DATED this

i

M2-

V^-.

day of

1995.

BY THE

> /C4^<^r

""GLENN IWASAK
District Court Judge
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ADDENDUM 4
500

W CALIFORNIA RKPOKTKK

writ of certiorari are granted and the
ie
judgment of the Court of Appeals is re*versed. The case is remanded with inistructions that it be returned to the Dis'trict Court for entry of a judgment of(
acquittal." {Watts v. United States, $v-f2
l>r,i, 394 U.S. p. 708, 89 S.Cl. p. 1402, 22
L.Ed.2d pp. 667-GfiH.)
The trial court's conclusion HS a matter off
law that Rubin's remarks were not a "true""
solicitation in violation of Penal Code sec-:tion 653f but were embraced in the Firstt
Amendment as permitted speech, in myy
opinion follows the law thus enunciated.I.
I would affirm.
Hearing denied; BIRD, C. J,, and MOSK,
J., dissenting.

96 Cal.App.3d

apply for and obtain her portion of naval
pension benefits was reservation of jurfodietion which permitted wife to thereafter an.
ply for order quantifying her interest and
permitted court to make appropriate apportionment; (2) apportionment made on basis
of years in service during marriage before
separation as compared to "qualifying"
years in service, such apportionment bearing no substantial relationship to amount of
the pension, was erroneous, and (3) proof of
change in circumstances is required for
modification of spousal support but converse is not necessarily true, and fact that
daughter had departed from residence
shared by mother and daughter did not
require finding of abuse of discretion on
part of trial court in declining to reduce
amount of, or to terminate, spousal support.
Order reversed in part, with directions,
and otherwise affirmed.

1. Divorce «=»240.1
97 C«l.App.3d 1

J j n re the MARKIAGK of Daniel G.
POITE and Josephine A. I'oppcDaniel G. Poppc, Petitioner
and Appellant,
And

Josephine A. I'oppe, Respondent,
Civ. 20642.
Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
Division 2.
Sept. 17, 1979.

On requests by former husband and
former wife for modification of provisions
of the court's judgment in a marriage dissolution proceeding, the Superior Courtt Orange County, James K. Turner, J.} rendered
judgment from which the former husband
appealed. The Court of Appeal, Kaufman,
JM held that: (J) notwithstanding certain
statements by the court in earlier hearing,
court's statement that wife had right to

Notwithstanding statements hy tho
court, in dissolution proceeding, that what
husband had accumulated by points toward
his navy pension prior to time of marriage
was 100% his separate property and that
wife was entitled to an amount based on
number of years to date of separation that
she had been married to him and was entitled to one half as community vested property interest as of such time, court's statement that wife had right to apply for and
obtain her portion of the benefit was reservation of jurisdiction which permitted wife
to thereafter apply for order quantifying
her interest and permitted court to make
appropriate apportionment.
2. Divorce <&=>252.3(4)
Apportionment of husband's naval pension made by trial court in marriage dissolution proceeding on basis of years in service during marriage before separation as
compared to "qualifying" years in service,
such apportionment bearing no substantia)
relationship to amount of the pension, was
erroneous.

97 CaLApp.3d 5
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3. Divorce $=*252.3(4)
. The "time rule" is apparently method
most frequently employed for apportioning
retirement benefits between community
and separate estates but is not the only
acceptable method and is appropriate only
wfiere amount of retirement benefits is substantially related to number of years of
service.
4. Divorce » 2 4 5 ( 2 , 3), 247
I Proof of change in circumstances is required for modification of spousal support,
but converse is not necessarily true, and
fact that daughter had departed from residence shared by mother and daughter did
not require finding of abuse of discretion on
pa|rt of trial court in declining to reduce,
amount of, or to terminate, spousal support.
5. JDivorce «*=> 252.3(4)
', Basis for apportionment of naval reserve pension as between separate and community estates on dissolution of marriage
was matter committed to judicial discretion
of | trial court, subject to requirement that
apportionment be reasonable and fairly representative of relative contributions of com*
miinity and separate estate.
James F. Rccs, Long Beach, for petitioner
and appellant.
James F. I^eck, New|>ort Beach, for respondent
JOPINION

&AUFMAN, Associate Justice.
The marriage of the parties was dissolved
by a final judgment on January 30, 1974,
referring to and incorporating the provisions of an interlocutory judgment entered
on! November 9, 1973. Daniel G, Poppe
(hereafter former husband) appeals from an
order of the court dated September 18,
1978, denying his request that spousal support be decreased or terminated and granting the application of Josephine A. Poppe
(former wife) for "modification" of the
judgment by fixing her interest in the Naval Rcscrvo pension being received by formed husband on the basis of the "time rule"
Hi one-half the fraction 27.25/31.50, the numerator being the number of years of re-

servo service during the marriage before
separation and the denominator being the
number of former husband's "qualifying"
years of service, which amount* to $253.60
of the total of $592 per month presently
being received.
Naval Reserve Pension
Former husband entered the Navy on
July 1, 1937. He served on active duty
from that date until July 18,1946, at which
time he became a member of the Naval
Reserve. On February 23,1946, the parties
were married. The parties separated on
June 16, 1973, and their marriage wasjsubBequcntly dissolved as previously indicated.
After the separation of the parties former
husband continued serving in the Naval Reserve until he retired on October 31, 1977.
He commenced receiving pension payments
on November 80, 1977.
Retirement benefits paid to Navy personnel retiring from active duty are based on
the number of years served and the amount
of the retiree's salary during active service.
Contrastingly, the amount of the pension
paid to Naval Reserve retirees is a percentage of the base pay for the rank achieved
arrived at on the basis of the number of
points accumulated by the retiree during
his service in the Naval Reserve. Essentially one point is earned for each drill attended. For example, 14 or 15 points would be
earned during the annual two weeks' training duty. For periods of active duty, one
point is credited for each day. To be eligible for retirement a Naval Reservist must
have been credited with a minimum number
of "qualifying" years of service, that is,
years in which 60 or more points were
earned. However, if the minimum "qualifying" years requirement is met, all points
earned are counted in the calculation of the
pension notwithstanding that in some years
less than 50 points were earned.
Former husband retired with a total of
5,002 points of which more than 8,000 were
earned during the period he was on active
duty prior to the marriage. The number of
points accumulated during the marriage
was 1,632. The balance of former husband's points were earned by him for his
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participation in the Naval Reserve after the Numbered paragraph 5 read: "The COURT
separation of the parties. It was former FURTHER ORDERS that respondent (forhuahancTb contention in the trial court that mer wife] has a right to apply for and
former wife's interest in the pension should obtain on© half of petitioner's fformer husbe computed hy multiplying one-half times band's] military pension benefits accrued
the fraction 1632/5002 times the amount of
between February 23, 1046 and June 16,
the pension, $592 per month. Apportioning 1973 when petitioner (former husband) is
the pension in that fashion, former wife's eligible to obtain said benefits."
share would amount to approximately
$98.50 per month, and former husband had
[1] Former husband contends that the
been paying that sum to former wife.
However, the trial court determined that court's intention to divide the retirement
former husband's "qualifying:" years totaled benefits in accordance with former hus31.50 and apportioned the pension on the band's ratio theory is evident from a diabasis of the "time rule" by dividing: the logue between the court and former bus*
27.25 years between marriage and separa- band near the conclusion of the dissolution
tion by the 3W> "qualifying" years so that hearing in which the court stated to former
former wife's share amounts to $253.60 per husband: "What you accumulated by points
toward your pension prior to the time of
month,1
marriage is a hundred }>erccnt your sepaFormer husband first contends that the
rate property." We cannot agree.
Naval Reserve pension was divided by the
court in the interlocutory judgment of disDuring the same dialogue the court statJ_s solution in {accordance with his point ratio ed, apparently to former wife: "Once he
theory, that that determination has lung [former husband] applies and once he gets
since become final and that the trial court it [the pensionj, then you're going to get an
lacked jurisdiction to alter the division long appropriate amount based on the number of
since and finally made. Not so.
years to the date of separation that yov
In numbered paragraph 4 of the interlocutory judgment the court purported to divide the community property. It dealt with
items "a" through "e," none of which was
the Naval Reserve retirement benefits.
1. Former husband contends that even if the
trial court's apportionment were otherwise correct, the denominator should have been the full
3G or 37 years he WAS in the service. Since we
conclude the basis for apportionment employed
by the remit was inappropriate, we do not
reach this question.
2. the dialogue in its entirety reads: "Now on
this Naval time the Court has to order that at
such time as you reach 60 or at such time as
you apply—Mrs, Poppe, if this man never applies for Naval retirement, you never get it. I
can't he more clear. You never get it if he
never applies. All right. Because that's within
his power and control. All ripht. Once he
applies mid once lie gets it, then you're going to
get an appropriate amount based on the number of years to the date of separation that you
were married lo him. You are entitled to onehalf as a community vested property interest as
of that time.
"Now Mr. Pop|>e, you continue on with Naval service, Everything hereafter you get full
credit; it's all yours. So, he'll be getting more

were married to him. You are entitled to
one-half as a community vested property
interest as of that time." (Emphasis added.) We think it rather clear from the
entire statement of the court 2 itaken to- J l
than you get, hut the Court will order that you
pay that proportionate [.share] at such lime as
you apply. And when you receive it and upon
receipt, then that proportionate share, you're
going to have to pay over to your wife, this
wife, Mrs. Poppc.
"MR. POPPE: I have a question. In fiRuiing
out the pension, it's based on points that you
accumulate lor the 25 year |>*» iod.
"THE COURT: That's right.
"MR. POPPE: And so would this stnrt when
the marriage started and stop when the marriage separated?
THE COURT: It starts—
"MR. POPPE: Anything before that, would
that count?
"THE COURT: Were you in the sarvice before you married?
"MR. POPPE: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: And you have credit f«i that?
"MR. POPPE: Yes, .sir.
"THE COURT: Then that's all yours. Thaijij
the reason you have to figure it out, That's
another item counsel is going to have to figure
out. When you prepare the decree, you figure
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gcther with the format and language of the
interlocutory judgment that what the court
did and intended to do was to adjudicate
that the community properly interest \n the
retirement benefits was that accruing between February 23, 194G and June 16,1973,
that former wife was entitled to one-half of
such community property interest if and
when former husband should become eligible for and apply for the pension and that
jurisdiction was reserved to permil the
court to make an order for an "appropriate
amount*' out of the pension to be paid to
former wife if and when pension payments
should materialize. Our conclusion in this
regard is confirmed by the fact that, so far
as appears, no evidence was introduced at
the dissolution trial as to how Naval Reserve retirement benefits were calculated
and no mention of the point system was
made at the hearing other than former
husband's query to the court near the conclusion of the hearing (see fn. 2, ante).
Further, hud the court intended finally to
divide the retirement benefits at the time
of the dissolution its use of the language
that former wife "has a right to apply for
and obtain" her portion of the benefits
would be rendered most inappropriate,
ThusT wife's application for a "modification" of the judgment of dissolution was in
reality a request to the court to exercise its
reserved jurisdiction to make an order specifying the proportion and amount of her
interest in the Naval Reserve pension. The
court having reserved jurisdiction by its
order that former wife would have in the
future the "right to apply for and obtain"
her share of the pension, the court was not
precluded from entertaining former wife's
application and making an order quantifying her interest.

503

preemptive of any stale law that would
apportion il upon dissolution of marriage on
another basis or that apportionment on the
basis of the "time rule" was arbitrary and
unreasonable and constituted an abuse of
judicial discretion. Former husband cites
no relevant authority in support of hb (fed- M
eral preemption argument, and wo reject it.
(Cf. Gorman v. Gorman, 90 CaLApp.3d 454T
460 462, 153 Cal.Rptr. 479.) However, wo
agree that the apportionment made by the
trial court was erroneous because the basis
upon which the apportionment was made,
years of service during the marriage before
separation compared to "qualifying" years
in service, bears no substantial rational relationship to the amount of the pension.
[3] Former wife assert* that the "time
rule" is the normal basis for apportioning
retirement benefits earned in part during
coveture and was appropriately employed
by the court in the case at bench. Although the "time rule*' is not the only acceptable method for apportioning retirement benefits between the community and
separate estates (see In re Marriage of Adains> 64 Cal.App.3d 181,186, fn. 6,187, fn. 8,
134 Cal.Rptr. 298), it is apparently the
method most frequently employed. (See, e.
g., in re Marriage of Judd, 68 Cal.App.Sd
515, 522, 137 Cal.Rptr. 318; In re Marriage
of Adams, supra, 6M CaLApp.Sd at pp. 181,
184, 134 Cal.Rptr, 298, et seq; In re Marriage of Anderson, 64 Cal.App.3d 36, 39-40,
134 Cal.Rptr, 252; In re Marriage of Freiberg, 57 CaUpp.Sd 304, 310, 127 Cal.Rptr.
792.)

However, apportionment on the basis of
the "time rule" is appropriate only where
the amount of the retirement benefits is
substantially related to the number of years
of service. The rule and it* rationale were
[2] Next former husband contends that aptly stated in fn ro Marriage of Judd,
the trial court's apportionment of the pen- supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 622-523, 137
sion was legally erroneous. Alternatively Cal.Rptr. 318, 321. "The most effective
he argues that the federal statute basing method of accomplishing the above result
Naval Unserve pensions on a point system is would be to determine the community init uut. What you accumulated by points toward your peusiun prior to the lime of marriage is a hundred percent your separate property, it's only from the dale of marriage that
the wife has one-half interest in that. And then

from the time of separation, not divorce but
separation, then that ends. All right. Is there
any item now of property that the Court has
not disposed of?"
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tcrcst to ho that fraction of retirement asnumber of years served. Thus the amount
sets, the numerator of which represents the of the pension is not a function of the
length of service during the marriage but number of years of service; the number of
before the separation, and the denominator years of service during the marriage is not
of which represents the total length of ser- a fair gauge of the community contribution;
vice by the cmployuc-spousc. Such disposiand the court's apportionment of the pention would comport with what we have sion on the basis of the number of "qualifytermed the 'time rule.' [Citation.l fl] . .
ing" years served as compared to the numThe reason why California courts have ac- ber of years of service during the marriage
cepted this manner of division as properly must be said to be unreasonable, arbitrary
implement!vc of the 'equal division' require- and an abuse of discretion.
ment of Civil Code section 4800 is apparent:
The argument that without the reserve
Where the total number of years served by
fin cmployec-spou&c is a substantial factor service during the marriage no pension at
m computing- the amount of retirement all would be received in correct, but it is of
benefits to be received by fhat spouse, the no significant help in resolving the problem.
community is entitled to have its share There would likewise hc» no pension but for
based upon the length of service performed former husband's service before the maron behalf of the community in proportion to riage and after the separation of the parthe total length of service necessary to earn ties. To the extent service during the marthose benefits. The relation between yearn riage contributed to former husband's rank
of community service to total years of ser- and thus increased his base pay, former
wife has no cause for complaint. The penvice provides a fair gauge of that portion of
retirement benefits attributable to commu- sion is based on the increased base pay, and
nity effort" (Emphasis added.) Thus it is she thus receives the benefit of the inthat in each and all of the cited cases the creased base pay. Indeed, she receives the
amount to be received in retirement bene- benefit also of any increase in base pay
I»r fits depended upon or was substantially] re- resulting from former husband's reserve
lated to the number of years of service service after separation of the parties.
rendered. (See In re Marriage of Judd, Spousal Supjtnrt
supra, 68 CaI.App.3d at pp. 5)9, 522-523,
The spousal support order made at the
137 Cal.Rptr. 318, 321; In re Adams, supra,
time
of the dissolution required former hus64 Cal.App.3d at p 186, 134 Cal.Rptr. 298;
band
to pay to former wife $200 per month
In re Marriage of Anderson, supra, 64 Cal.
for
one
year, thereafter $150 per month for
App.3d at p. 39, 134 Cal.Rptr. 262; In re
Marriage of Freiberg, supra, 57 Cal.App.3d one year and thereafter $100 a month until
further order of the court. At that time
at p. 308, 127 Cal.Rptr. 792.)
former wife was unemployed, and the court
In the case at bench the amount of forindicated to her that one reason it was
mer husband's pension is not substantially
making the Btepclown order was to give her
related to the number of years he served in
incentive to find employment.
the Naval Reserve. The only relationship
I Subsequently she did find employment J±«
between the number of years of service and
and on May 7, 1974, former husband filed
the pension is that to be eligible for the
an order to show cause re modification, in
pension former husband must have served a
which he sought the termination of support.
minimum number of "qualifying" years,
years in which be earned SO or more points. After hearing the court ordered the amount
That condition having been satisfied, all of the monthly payment reduced from $150
points earned, whether in a "qualifying" to $100 one year in advance of the time
year or not, counted in fixing the amount of tabic set forth in the original order.
his pension. The number of points that can
be earned in a year may be as high as 364
or as low as 1, depending on the nature and
frequency of the service rendered, not the

The instant proceedings were commenced
by former husband's filing another order to
show cause re modification for the termination of spousal support. This time his re-
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quest for termination was based on the fact
that the daughter of the parties born December 1), 1957, had married and moved
from the residence which she had shared
with former wife up to that time.
Former husband points out that at the
hearing former wife admitted in her testimony that her expenses would be somewhat
reduced because of the daughter's marriage
and departure from the residence they
shared. Former husband concludes that a
change of circumstances was shown, and
the trial court Abused its discretion in dedining to reduce the amount of or terminate spousal support. Not so.
[4] In the first place, former husband's
premise that a change of circumstances was
shown does not support his conclusion that
a modification or termination of spousal
support, WHS thereby required. A modification of spousal support cannot be granted in
the absence of proof of a change in circumstances. However, the converse is not true;
a showing of changed circumstances docs
not necessarily mandate a modification of
spousal support.
In any event, there is no showing whatever that the trial court abused its discretion
in requiring former husband to continue to
pay spousal support in the amount of $100
per month. Former wife is employed, but
her gross earnings approximate $692 per
month. In addition her financial declaration disclosed income of $100 per month in
public assistance and $95.33 per month paid
to her by former husband on account of her
interest in the Naval Reserve pension. She
thus had gross income of $887.33 per month
and a monthly net of $714.53. Her listed
monthly expenses, which appear to be quite
modest, amounted to $8)6 pQ.r month, $102
per month in excess of her net earnings.
By contrast, husband's net monthly income
was declared by him to l>c $1,572 per month,
and his monthly expenses wore listed as
$1,355 per month. Thus, by his own figures
former husband's net income exceeded his
expenses by more than $200 jwr month.
The duration of the marriage was in excess
Ji* ofj27 years, and former wife is entitled to
maintain a standard of living not substantially different from that of former hux-
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band, especially when former husband's
own figures indicate that he is well able to
pay the required support.
The court acted with propriety in declining to modify the amount of spousal
support.
[6] Having concluded that the apportionment of the Naval Reserve pension
made by the trial court is erroneous, the
question remains what disposition to make.
The requirement is that the apportionment
of retirement benefits between the separate
and community property estates must be
reasonable and fairly representative of the
relative contributions of the community and
separate estates. (Sec In re Marriage of
Judd, supra, 68 CaLApp.Sd at pp. 52£-523,
137 CaLRptr. 318; In re Marriage of Adurns, suprn, 64 Cai.App.3d at p, 187, 134
Cal.Rptr, 298; cf. in re Marriage of Freiberg, suprn, 57 Cal.App.3d at p. 312, 127
Cal.Rptr. 792.) The basis for apportionment, however, is a matter committed to
the judicial discretion of the trial court.
(See In IV Marriage of Judd, supra, 68
. Cal.App.3d At p. 522, 137 Cal.Rptr. 318; In
re Marriage of Adams, supra; cf. In re
Marriage of Freiberg, supra.) The discretion to be exercised is that of the trial
court, not a reviewing court. (See In re
Marriage of Judd, supra.) Although it is
fairly obvious that apportionment on the
basis of points as urged by former husband
would be Appropriate, we would usurp the
function of the trial court by modifying the
judgment to apportion the retirement benefits on that basis.
Accordingly, the order is reversed insofar
as it establishes former wife's interest in
the Naval Reserve pension, with directions
to the trial court to redetermine the respective interests in the pension in a manner
and o)i a basis consistent with this opinion.
In all other respects the order appealed
from is affirmed. In the interests of justice
former wife shall recover costs on appeal,
but the parties shall bear their own respective attorney fees on appeal.
TAMURA, Acting P. J., and McDANIEL,
J., concur.

